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THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT-WHERE THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT WENT WRONG IN SHALIEHSABOU V. HEBREW HOME OF
GREATER WASHINGTON. JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT EXEMPTIONS TO INCLUDE MINISTERIAL
EMPLOYEES
INTRODUCTION
Imagine being an employee who works at least forty hours
each week, whose duties require specialized training, but who is not
entitled to a minimum wage or overtime pay. If you live within the
jurisdiction of the Fourth Circuit, you could experience this very
problem. In a recent decision, l the Fourth Circuit held that protec
tions afforded by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA")2
do not apply to particular employees of religious organizations.
The implications of this holding and its persuasive effect are far
reaching, as nearly 1.5 million people in the United States are em
ployed by non-profit religious organizations. 3 The FLSA was en
acted for the specific purpose of protecting employees from gross
inequalities in the workplace. 4 Although exemptions from the
Act's protection have decreased over time,S the number of employ
ees left unprotected from wage and hour inequality is still high.
Prior to 1938, when Congress enacted the FLSA, employers
were not required under federal law to provide fair labor protection
to employees. 6 The FLSA was intended to be a far-reaching piece
of legislation that would establish standards to eradicate poor work
ing conditions and inequality, which were leading to labor disputes. 7
1. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir.
2004), reh'g en bane denied, 369 F.3d 797 (4th Cir. 2004).
2. 29 U.s.c. §§ 201-219 (2000).
3. See The Foundation Center, Frequently Asked Questions, http://fdncenter.org!
learnlfaqslhtml/employed.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
4. Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and The Fair Labor Standards Act, 18
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19, 98-99 (2000).
5. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer 160-61 (Ellen C. Keams et al. eds., 1999).
6. Id. at 2. In 1938, the FLSA established fair labor protections, including mini
mum wage and overtime regulations, and severe restrictions on child labor. Harris,
supra note 4, at 15.
7. Harris, supra note 4, at 20-22; see also THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer,
supra note 5, at 11-12. Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 to combat both child labor
and great inequality in the workforce. Id. at 13-15. The Act set standards for minimum
wage, maximum hours, and child labor. ld. at 15.
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In recent years, however, citizens have begun to take the protec
tions provided by the FLSA, and the Act itself, for granted. s
The emergence of federal fair labor standards gave rise to a
wide array of questions of meaning and application.9 Should a re
ligious organization be compelled to pay its employees minimum
wage and overtime pay, or would the government be overstepping
its constitutional bounds1o by imposing such a mandate? Should
the exemptions that apply to members of the clergy also apply to
janitors and kitchen staff employed by religious organizations? The
judiciary and the legislature have grappled with these questions for
decades. l1 Consequently, legal repercussions of the Act are not
clear and they now encompass an evolving body of law for the
courts to interpret.
This Note focuses on the Fourth Circuit decision in Shalieh
sabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc., which raises
the issue of whether the FLSA provides a ministerial exemption in
any circumstance and whether such an exemption would be similar
in scope to the ministerial exemption recognized under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII").12
In an effort to frame the issue in Shaliehsabou, Part I provides
historical justifications for and the legislative history of the FLSA.
Additionally, this section describes exemptions under the FLSA
and Title VII. There is divisive judicial debate concerning the use
8. "Having lived under the [Fair Labor Standards] Act for all of these years, the
nation has begun to take for granted the principles upon which the Act is based." THE
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, supra note 5, at 2.
9. Id. at 16-17. Nearly each year since its enactment, amendments to the FLSA
have been a topic of legislative initiative. Id. This Note will particularly address how
the FLSA should be applied to workers employed by religious organizations.
10. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America
states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CaNsT. amend. I, d. 1. This Note considers
whether Congress's requiring a religious employer to pay a minimum wage and over
time pay to employees would violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
11. See, e.g., Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290
(1985); Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879 (7th CiT. 1954); 112
CONGo REc. 11360, 11371 (1966).
12. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2 (2000). Generally, Title VII prohibits discrimination in
employment. Id. However, it also provides an exception:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this [subchapter] ... it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees
... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise ....
42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(e).
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of Title VII in construing potential exemptions under the FLSA.
The main contention turns on whether application of the FLSA to
ministerial employees violates the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment in the same way that application of Title VII does.
Part II of this Note discusses the relevant case law underlying
the Shaliehsabou court's reasoning, first looking at Title VII cases
and then FLSA cases. Additionally, the main points of the Shalieh
sabou majority and dissenting opinions are explained to clarify the
legal contentions concerning a potential ministerial exemption to
the FLSA.
Part III provides a legal analysis of the proposed ministerial
exemption, particularly focusing on the dissenting opinion provided
by Judge Luttig in Shaliehsabou. Essentially, this section argues
that Congress did not intend to create a ministerial exemption from
the FLSA and that such an exemption cannot be reconciled with
past Supreme Court decisions or the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court historically has been hesitant
to place governmental restrictions on religious organizations. 13 In
particular circumstances, however, the Court has required religious
organizations to abide by the terms of the FLSA.14 Moreover, the
Court has never examined a case factually similar to Shaliehsabou,
where the Fourth Circuit recognized a ministerial exemption under
the FLSA.1 5 This Note will therefore put aside the question of
whether the Supreme Court is likely to interfere with religious or
ganizations' autonomy with respect to wages. The primary objec
tive of this Note is to highlight the shortcomings in a line of
reasoning that began in the Department of Labor and resulted in
the Shaliehsabou decision-this goal can be accomplished without
speculation as to whether the Supreme Court would agree with
Judge Luttig's proposed outcome in Shaliehsabou.

13. Oliver S. Thomas, The Power To Destroy: The Eroding Constitutional Argu
ments For Church Tax Exemption And The Practical Effect On Churches, 22 CUMBo L.
REV. 605, 611 (1992); see, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity V. United States, 143 U.S. 457
(1892) (finding that a statute prohibiting importation of foreign labor did not apply to a
religious organization).
14. See, e.g., Tony and Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 290 (holding that a relig
ious foundation was required to comply with the FLSA).
15. Arguably, the Court will undertake a fact-based inquiry when deciding
whether to place restrictions on a religious organization.
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THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr AND TITLE VII

In Shaliehsabou, the Fourth Circuit not only recognized a min
isterial exemption from the FLSA, but also held that this exemption
was similar in scope to the ministerial exemption from Title VII.16
In order to consider the legitimacy and the implications of this
holding, it is first necessary to consider the historical context lead
ing to the enactment of the FLSA, the Act's legislative history, and
the recognized exemptions under both the FLSA and Title VII.
A.

Legislative History of the FLSA

In 1938, Congress attempted to combat inequity in the
workforce by setting minimum standards for wages, hours, and
child labor in the FLSA.17 Prior to the enactment of the FLSA,
societal conflict raged between proponents of absolute freedom of
contract in the employment setting and those who insisted on
remediation of the disproportionate balance of bargaining power
between employers and employees. 18 At the height of the Indus
trial Revolution, the 1920s saw a shift in population from rural
farmlands to towns and urban areas, resulting in a dramatic in
crease in employment throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 19 This in
crease, along with the mechanization of industry, led to far greater
productivity.20 But the increase in number of persons seeking em
ployment and new-found industrial efficiency meant that workers
possessed significantly less bargaining power than did their employ
ers.21 To combat wage and hour inequities, as well as the evil of
child labor, Congress began to enact legislation in particular indus
16. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 299, 305-07
(4th Cir. 2004). "The ministerial exception operates to exempt from the coverage of
various employment laws the employment relationships between religious institutions
and their ministers." Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 247 F.
Supp. 2d 728, 730 (D. Md. 2003), affd, 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004). For further discus
sion of the constitutionally compelled exemption to Title VII, see infra Part I.c.
17. Harris, supra note 4, at 19-23 (referring to 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-219 (2000»; see
also William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Every
thing Old is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 270 (2002).
18. Harris, supra note 4, at 21. Harris notes that "[f]rom the demise of slavery
through the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938, participants in the debate
over fairness in wages increasingly accepted the premise that individual workers had
significantly less bargaining power in the labor market than employers." Id at 20.
19. Id. at 97-98. This shift was partially due to a rural depression and the rela
tively high pay of urban jobs. Id.; see also IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1920-1933 48 (1960).
20. Harris, supra note 4, at 98.
21. Id. at 98-99.
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tries, but "was not yet prepared to reach out to regulate the condi
tions of employment in general."22 Even before Congress
attempted to address the problem of inequity in the workforce,
many states had taken legislative action in this area. 23 But by the
mid-1930s it was evident that federal law was necessary to establish
nationwide fair labor standards. 24
In 1937, President Roosevelt sent a message to Congress press
ing it to enact such a statute. 25 President Roosevelt stated,
Our nation ... should be able to devise ways and means of insur
ing to all our able-bodied working men and women a fair day's
pay for a fair day's work. A self-supporting and self-respecting
democracy can plead no justification for the existence of child
labor, no economic reason for chiseling workers' wages or
stretching workers' hours.
Enlightened business is learning that competition ought not
to cause bad social consequences which inevitably react upon the
profits of business itself.... Government must have some control
over maximum hours, minimum wages, the evil of child labor,
and the exploitation of unorganized labor.26

In response, the 75th Congress held a number of hearings and,
22. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, supra note 5, at 5. In 1868, Congress
passed a statute mandating an eight-hour maximum work day for government workers.
Yet, in effect, this statute did not stop workers from performing overtime work. Id. at 3
4. In 1915, Congress specifically addressed problems in the shipping industry by enact
ing maximum hour restrictions, along with restrictions on overworking sailors and mini
mum food and drink allowances for sailors. Id. at 4-5. In 1935, Congress imposed
maximum hour standards on the Motor Carriers to ensure public safety in this industry.
Id. at 5-6. In 1931, Congress enacted the Davis-Bacon Act, which required federal con
tractors to pay employees according to the wage that prevailed among employees en
gaged in a similar line of work in that region. Id. at 6-7. The Walsh-Healey
Government Contracts Act mandates specific working conditions and wages for work
ers under contract with the federal government. Id. at 7-8. In 1933, Congress passed the
National Industrial Recovery Act allowing the president to control maximum hours,
minimum wages, and any other employment conditions in an industry that was engag
ing in "unfair competition" or unfair practices. Id. at 8-9.
23. Id. at 9. Some state statutes set a monetary minimum wage while others ap
pointed a commission to do so. Id. at 10. Ironically, state minimum wage laws typically
"applied only to women and children, whose freedom to contract was already limited by
their 'weakness' and inferiority in society." Id. at 10-11; see also West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 394-95 (1937) (holding that certain legislation that was designed
to protect women was not necessary to protect men).
24. Harris, supra note 4, at 20; see also THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, supra
note 5, at 11-12.
25. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, supra note 5, at 11-12
26. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, WAGES AND HOURS: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESI
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 75-255, at 2 (1937).
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after the proposal of various pieces of legislation in both the House
and the Senate, the House and Senate Labor Committees issued a
joint statementP The statement proposed that the "maintenance
of substandard labor conditions" by even a few employers within an
industry negatively affects interstate commerce. 28 In the end, repu
table employers were being unfairly disadvantaged because low
wages and poor working conditions often resulted in dissatisfied
employees and labor disputes. 29 States were powerless to address
the issue because goods produced under substandard labor condi
tions were flowing freely to states that attempted to enforce fair
labor laws. 3D The joint committee concluded,
[T]he existence in industries engaged in commerce, or in the pro
duction of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental
to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary
for health, efficiency and general well-being, required immediate
action to correct, and as rapidly as possible to eliminate, condi
tions in such industries without substantially curtailing employ
ment or earning power. 31

After much debate and several legislative proposals, the FLSA
was adopted on June 25, 1938, establishing minimum wage, over
time, and child labor provisions. 32 The FLSA protections do not,
however, reach every employed person. Indeed, as this Note will
discuss in the following section, Congress has carved out numerous
exemptions from the FLSA.

B.

FLSA Coverage and Exemptions

Congress intended the FLSA to be far-reaching in order to
combat a broad societal problem. 33 To benefit from the protections
afforded by the FLSA, a bona fide employment relationship must
exist between an employer and a worker. 34 The FLSA's legislative
27.
28.

THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 12-13.
Id. at 12.
29. Id. at 12-13.
30. Id. at 13.
31. H.R. REP. No. 75-2738, at 28 (1937) (Conf. Rep.).
32. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 14-15.
33. Id. at 295-303.
'34. Id. at 71-77; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (2000). The Act defines an employee as
"any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.c. § 203(e)(1) (2000). An employer
is defined as "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee ...." 29 U.S.c. § 203(d). The "verb 'employ' [is defined]
expansively to mean 'suffer or permit to work.'" Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden,
503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (quoting 29 U.S.c. § 203(g». In Nationwide, the Supreme
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history demonstrates that Congress intended the term "employee"
to have an expansive scope. 35 Senator Hugo Black stated that the
term "employee" in the FLSA was intended to be given "the
broadest definition that has ever been included in anyone act. "36
Another Congressman characterized the FLSA as "the most mo
mentous and far-reaching measure that ... [Congress has] consid
ered for many years."37 The United States Supreme Court also
noted that the"[b]readth of coverage was vital to the [Act's] rnis
sion"38 to eradicate substandard working conditions. 39
To determine whether a person is an employee for FLSA pur
poses, courts look at the totality of the circumstances, and particu
larly at the "economic reality" of the relationship.40 The Supreme
Court explained that the economic reality test considers whether
one took a job "in expectation of compensation."41 An individual
who works solely for pleasure or other non-financial purpose, with
out promise or expectation of compensation, is not protected by the
Court also stated that the definition of the word employ "stretches the meaning of
'employee' to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict applica
tion of traditional agency principles." Id. at 326. The Supreme Court has also indicated
that this definition is so far-reaching that it may even cover persons other than those
Congress intended to include. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, supra note 5, at 76
n.7 (citing Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947)) (holding that the
definition, if taken literally, could be read to include students as employees of the
schools that they attended). In addition to the "employee" criteria, the employer must
also be an "enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for com
merce." 29 U.S.c. § 203(r). In Shaliehsabou, however, Hebrew Home's enterprise sta
tus is not at issue. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299
(4th Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane denied, 369 F.3d 797 (4th Cir. 2004).
35. John Bruntz, The Employee/Independent Contractor Dichotomy: A Rose is
Not Always a Rose, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 337, 341-42 (1991); see also id. at 342
n.48 (citing Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 874 (1982) (quoting Senator Hugo Black's statement that the term "employee"
in the FLSA was intended to be given "the broadest definition that has ever been in
cluded in anyone act")).
36. 81 CONGo REC. 7648, 7657 (1937).
37. 83 CONGo REC. 9246, 9262 (1938) (statement of Representative Fish).
38. Bruntz, supra note 35, at 355 (citing 83 CONGo REC. 9262 (1938) and Powell v.
United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 516 (1950)).
39. Corbett, supra note 17, at 355.
40. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, supra note 5, at 73; see also Bartels v.
Birmingham, 332 U.s. 126, 130 (1947) (holding that "employees are those who as a
matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they render
service").
41. Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301-02 (1985).
The "economic reality" test is also used to determine whether an entity can be defined
as an enterprise under the Act. Courts must assess whether the entity has entered the
"economic arena [and is involved in] trafficking in the marketplace." Id. at 294.
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FLSA.42 Considering the broad scope intended by Congress, the
Supreme Court's economic reality test appears relatively easy to
meet.
Despite the all-encompassing definition of the term "em
ployee," and the broad application intended by Congress, the
FLSA does enumerate certain exceptions to its minimum wage and
overtime requirements. 43 In light of the societal conditions that
Congress intended to rectify by enacting the FLSA, courts construe
the statutory exemptions from the FLSA narrowly.44 The Supreme
Court explained that Congress specifically developed certain excep
tions to the FLSA and that "[t]he details with which the exemptions
in this Act have been made preclude their enlargement by implica
tion."45 In A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling ("A.H. Phillips"),46 a case
involving a FLSA exemption (that was later repealed) for retail es
tablishments,47 the Supreme Court held that "[t]o extend an exemp
tion to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms
and spirit is to abuse the interpretive process and to frustrate the
announced will of the people."48 However, confusion relating to
congressional debate 49 over a proposed 1966 amendment to the
FLSA led the Fourth Circuit to do precisely what the Supreme
Court warned against in A.H. Phillips.
In 1966, Congress considered a proposed amendment to the
42. [d. at 295 (quoting Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 u.s. 148, 152
(1947».
43. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 295-303. Very particular
ized exemptions are provided for certain white-collar workers, agricultural workers,
seamen, and babysitters, to name a few. For a list of additional exemptions, see id. at
295-303. Congress included these narrow exemptions partially because its regulation of
particular activities, which were traditionally controlled by the states, would be beyond
the scope of the Commerce Power. Id. at 30-31. Throughout the existence of the FLSA,
Congress has created and revoked exemptions. The number of exemptions, for both
minimum wage and overtime requirements, recognized by Congress has decreased over
time. Consequently, the FLSA's protections have increasingly been extended to more
employees. Id. at 160-61. See id. at 295-303 for a list of exemptions, including those
which have been repealed.
44. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 162-63 (citing to Addison
v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods. Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944».
45. Addison, 322 U.S. at 618.
46. 324 U.S. 490 (1945).
47. 29 U.S.c. § 213(a)(2) (repealed 1989).
48. A.H. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 493. The Court reasoned, "Congress did not intend
to exempt as a 'retail establishment' the warehouse and central office of an interstate
chain store system." [d. at 496-97.
49. For further consideration of this congressional debate, see infra Parts II.B.2
and III.B.
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FLSA regarding the meaning of the term "enterprise."50 During
the debate, an exchange took place which focused on whether nuns
employed in the cafeteria of a parochial elementary school would
be exempt from the Act's minimum wage requirements. 51 The
question was answered affirmatively.52 Although the final version53
of the 1966 Amendment only focused on the definition of the term
"enterprise," and not the term "employee," both the Department
of Labor ("DOL") and the Fourth Circuit54 relied upon the afore
mentioned exchange to justify a ministerial exemption to the term
"employee" under the FLSA.55 Judge Luttig's dissent in the
Shaliehsabou case concerning the majority's improper reliance on
congressional exchanges has considerable merit. 56 This is especially
true in light of the Fourth Circuit's reliance on Title VII cases when
considering FLSA wage and hour issues because Title VII treat
ment of hiring issues is inapplicable to FLSA treatment of wage and
hour issues.
C.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

In an effort to desegregate employment, particularly in the
South, Congress included Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 57
50. 29 U.S.c. § 203(r) (2000). Issues surrounding the meaning of the term "enter
prise" are beyond the scope of this Note. However, congressional debate on this issue,
addressed later in this Note, does shed light on whether ministerial workers are "em
ployees" under the FLSA. See infra Parts II.B.2 and III.B.
51. 112 CONGo REc. 11360, 11371 (1966).
52. Id.
Mr. PUCINSKI. Let us consider a parochial elementary school, in which the
nuns do the work in the cafeteria. Would they have to be paid a minimum
wage?
Mr. COLLIER. No, they would not be covered.
Mr. BURTON of California. As I understand, it is not the gentleman's inten
tion to include members of a religious order under the definition of employee,
and therefore a nun would not be considered an employee. Therefore, a mini
mum wage would not be required to be paid a nun. Am I correct in my under
standing of the gentleman's intention?
Mr. COLLIER. That is correct. I did not intend to cover them.
Id.
53. 29 U.S.c. § 203(r).
54. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 299, 305-07
(4th Cir. 2004); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990).
55. 112 CONGo REC. 11360, 11371 (1966). For further discussion see infra Parts
II.B.2 and III.B.
56. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 797, 802 (4th
Cir. 2004) (Luttig, J., dissenting).
57. LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS Acr 21, 49 (Bernard Grofman ed.,
2000) (citing 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e-2000e-17).
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Title VII prohibits discrimination in the employment setting. 58
Courts have found it difficult, however, to reconcile the goal of
non-discrimination in the workplace with religious organizations'
right to, and need for, autonomy in employing ministers and clergy
members. 59 Indeed, courts must confront the seemingly inevitable
collision between the compelling objective of safeguarding against
discrimination and the government neutrality mandated by the re
ligion clauses of the First Amendment. 60 Since the enactment of
Title VII, courts have been called upon to differentiate between
government promotion of religion through preferential treatment
provided to religious organizations, which is impermissible, and the
permissible effect of allowing religious organizations to advance re
ligion without governmental interference. 61
58. Id. Under Title VII, "[e]mployers may hire and fire, promote and refuse to
promote for any reason, good or bad, provided only that individuals may not be dis
criminated against because of race, religion, sex or national origin." RICHARD ALLEN
EpSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAWS 161 n.2 (1992) (citing Senator Humphrey's remarks at 110 CONGo REc. 6548
(1964)).
59. See, e.g., Combs V. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of United Methodist
Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999) (denying female clergy member's claim that
church-minister exception under Title VII no longer exists); E.E.O.C. V. Catholic Univ.
of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (sex discrimination claim brought by Catholic nun
in relation to denial of tenure at Catholic university); Minker V. Baltimore Annual Con
ference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (age discrimination
suit filed by minister who had his request for reassignment denied); Rayburn V. Gen.
Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Of course
churches are not-and should not be-above the law. Like any other person or organi
zation, they may be held liable for their torts and upon their valid contracts. Their
employment decisions may be subject to Title VII scrutiny, where the decision does not
involve the church's spiritual functions.").
60. The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an es
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting free exercise thereof ...." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
"The Establishment Clause ... prevents a State from enacting laws that have the 'pur
pose' or 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion." Zelman V. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639,648-49 (citing Agostini V. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997). It is clear that a
religious organization's hiring decisions are protected by the Free Exercise Clause and
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The government cannot tell a relig
ious organization whom it should or should not hire. For further discussion of whether
a similar analysis should apply to overtime pay and a minimum wage requirements
under the FLSA, see infra Part III.D.
61. Laura L. Coon, Employment Discrimination By Religious Institutions: Limit
ing the Sanctuary o/the Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employ
ment Decisions, 54 VAND. L. REv. 481, 495 (2001) (citing Corp. of the Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints V. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336-37
(1987». In Amos, the Court clarified, "A law is not unconstitutional simply because it
allows churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to have
forbidden effects ... government [must have] advanced religion through its own activi
ties and influence." Coon, supra note 61, at 495 n.55 (citing Corp. of the Presiding
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Congress did not intend Title VII to apply to employees who
performed religious functions. 62 Thus, when an employee asserts a
Title VII employment discrimination claim against a religious or
ganization, the employer typically invokes the protection of Title
VII's statutory religious exemption63 or the constitutional ministe
rial exception. 64 Indeed, § 702 of Title VII exempts religious corpo
rations, associations, educational institutions, or societies from the
Title's provisions "with respect to the employment of individuals of
a particular religion to perform work connected with" the organiza
tion's activities. 65 Prior to a congressional amendment to § 702 in
1972, the exemption applied only to an organization's "religious"
activities. 66 The 1972 amendment deleted the word "religious,"
thereby removing Title VII protection for workers who performed
secular duties for religious organizations as well as those who per
formed religious duties. 67
Following the 1972 amendment, numerous employees chal
lenged the constitutionality of the exemption. 68 Challengers al
leged that § 702 "favored religious organizations by allowing
religious employers to avoid application of Title VII, while similarly
situated non-religious employers remained open to liability,"
thereby violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amend
ment. 69 Thus, courts have been hesitant to construe § 702 as vest
ing complete immunity from discrimination claims in religious
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337
(1987».
62. Coon, supra note 61, at 487.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2000).
64. Coon, supra note 61, at 486. The constitutional ministerial exemption is
rooted in both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
65. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-1.
66. Civil Rights Act of 1964, PUB. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255; see
Joanne C. Brant, "Our Shield Belongs to the Lord": Religious Employers and a Consti
tutional Right to Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CaNST. L.Q. 275, 284 (1994).
67. Brant, supra note 66, at 284. In McClure v. Salvation Army, the Fifth Circuit
extended the constitutional ministerial exemption to discrimination based on sex, race
and national origin, explaining, "The relationship between an organized church and its
ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks
to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized
as of prime ecclesiastical concern." Coon, supra note 61, at 499-506 (referring to Mc
Clure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972»;
see also Janet S. Belcove-Shalin, Ministerial Exception and Title-VII Claims: Case Law
Grid Analysis, 2 NEV. L.J. 86 (2002).
68. Coon, supra note 61, at 488.
69. [d. The Establishment Clause prohibits state governance that either inhibits
or advances religion. [d.
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organizations. 70 Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitu
tionality of Title VII's built-in exception for both secular and non
secular activities of religious institutions,?1 subsequent federal case
law has limited the extent to which such organizations can assert
immunity from employment discrimination claims.72 Moreover,
most courts have held that religious organizations may discriminate
only if discriminatory employment decisions are "sufficiently
rooted in religious belief or practice to implicate the First Amend
ment's Religion Clauses."73
II.
A.

RELEVANT CASE LAW

Title VII Cases

Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists 74 is
the first Fourth Circuit case to articulate the standard for applying
the Title VII ministerial exception.75 Rayburn, who applied for an
internship with the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, alleged that the
church sexually and racially discriminated against her in violation of
Title VII.76 Cognizant that Title VII did not protect religious em
ployers from all forms of employment discrimination, the court de
veloped a test that balanced the goals of Title VII with a religious
organization's constitutional right to religious autonomy.77 The re
sulting standard considers the employee's position, or the position
sought, to determine "'if the employee's primary duties consist of
teaching, spreading the faith, church governance supervision of a
religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual
and worship.' "78 If the question is answered in the affirmative,
then a ministerial exemption applies, and the organization is not
held to Title VII mandates with respect to employment discrimina
tion.7 9 To avoid excessive entanglement in church matters by sub
70. Id.
71. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
72. Coon, supra note 61, at 503.
73. [d.
74. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th
Cir. 1985).
75. [d. at 1169.
76. [d. at 1165.
77. Coon, supra note 61, at 504.
78. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (quoting Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the
Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations,
79 COLUM. L. REv. 1514, 1545 (1979)).
79. Id.
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jectively evaluating religious factors, the court deferred to the
church's hiring decision. 80 The court held that "introduction of gov
ernment standards to the selection of spiritual leaders would signifi
cantly and perniciously rearrange the relationship between church
and state."81 The position at issue in Rayburn was that of a liaison
between the church and "those whom it would touch with its mes
sage."82 Because the selection process involved subjective religious
elements, such as spirituality, the church was entitled to non-inter
ference by the government pursuant to the First Amendment's re
ligion clauses. 83
A later Fourth Circuit decision that applied the "primary du
ties" standard established by Rayburn was Equal Employment Op
portunity Commission v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh
("EEOC").84 In EEOC, the plaintiff was employed by a Catholic
elementary school as a music teacher. 85 Her primary duties con
sisted of planning parish liturgies, directing the choir, and teaching
music classes to students. 86 The plaintiff filed suit alleging that her
employment was limited, and then terminated, because of her sex. 87
The court held that the well-recognized ministerial exception pro
hibited application of Title VII in this particular employment deci
sion because the "constitutionally compelled limitation on civil
authority ensures that no branch of secular government trespasses
on the most spiritually intimate grounds of a religious community's
existence."88 The court did note, however, that the ministerial ex
ception does not exempt religious employers from application of
federal anti-discrimination statutes altogether. 89 Rather, the ex
emption is limited to spiritual functions. 90 After applying the pri
80. Coon, supra note 61, at 505 (citing Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167-68). Govern
ment entanglement in religious matters constitutes a violation of the First Amendment.
Id.
81. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.
82. Id. at 1168.
83. Id.
84. 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000).
85. Id. at 798.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 800. The court also noted that this doctrine of non-interference with
church employment decisions is widely recognized in other circuits.
89. Id. at 801 ("Where no spiritual function is involved, the First Amendment
does not stay the application of a generally applicable law such as Title VII to the
religious employer."). The Title VII exemption is limited to what is necessary to com
ply with the First Amendment. Id.; see also Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171.
90. EEOC, 213 F.3d at 801. For example, the Act would not apply to a religious
organization's hiring of custodial or administrative personnel. Id.
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mary duties test, the court concluded that the plaintiff's primary
duties were ministerial and, therefore, the plaintiff was not afforded
the protection of Title VII.91 The court's decision to provide a Title
VII ministerial exemption for an employee who spreads religious
faith through teaching music and planning liturgies is consistent
with the "primary duties" test set forth in Rayburn. 92

B.

Fair Labor Standards Act Cases

Here, the discussion turns to several judicial interpretations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act's applicability with respect to relig
ious organizations. This section first addresses the principal case,93
in which the issues set forth in this Note arose. Next, the discussion
turns to Dole ,94 a Fourth Circuit case on which the Shaliehsabou
court relied, and also Alamo,95 a Supreme Court decision which the
Shaliehsabou court failed to consider.
1.

Principal Case: Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater
Washington

In Shaliehsabou, the plaintiff worked for the defendant, a non
profit religious and charitable corporation, as a Mashgiach. 96 As a
Mashgiach, the plaintiff was responsible for ensuring that food
served to residents of the Hebrew Home, which predominantly
housed members of the Jewish faith, conformed with Jewish dietary
laws. 97 Shaliehsabou worked in this capacity from 1992 through
August 2000. 98 Upon his resignation, Shaliehsabou filed suit in Ma
ryland state court alleging that he was entitled to overtime wages
pursuant to the FLSA and Maryland state law because, throughout
91. Id. at 802. The court concluded that the position was ministerial because it
was important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.
92. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.
93. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 728
(D. Md. 2003), affd, 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004).
94. Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990).
95. Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
96. Shaliehsabou, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 729 n.2. A Mashgiach is "an inspector ap
pointed by a board of Orthodox rabbis to guard against any violation of Jewish dietary
laws." RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1181 (2d ed. 1998).
97. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash. Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 301 (4th
Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane denied, 369 F.3d 797 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Shaliehsabou, 247
F. Supp. 2d at 729 n.2 (noting that a Mashgiach is a central figure in Jewish dietary law
who ensures that Jewish kosher laws are enforced). "[A] Mashgiach is essential, may be
required on the premises at all times, must be present to check all products brought into
the establishment and must also be present during the preparation of food." Id.
98. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 300.
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his employment, he was not compensated for all overtime hours
worked. 99 The case was removed to the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland, which held that Shaliehsabou
fell within a ministerial exemption to the FLSA and, therefore, was
not entitled to overtime pay.lOO Shaliehsabou appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which af
firmed the lower court's decision.l° 1 Subsequently, Shaliehsabou
petitioned the Fourth Circuit to hear the case en banc.l°2 His peti
tion was denied. 103
The United States District Court identified the primary issue as
whether "the ministerial exemption applies," because if it did, the
plaintiff would not be "a covered employee" under the FLSA.104
The U.S. District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit both held that the plaintiff was employed in a
ministerial role by a religiously affiliated employer and thus was not
entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA.105 The primary authority
cited by the District Court and the Fourth Circuit majority was the
Fourth Circuit's opinion in Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church. 106
[d. at 303-04.
100. Shaliehsabou, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 733. The district court also noted that even
if Shaliehsabou did not fall within the ministerial exemption, he was an exempt execu
tive, administrative or professional employee, under 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1-541.3 (2003). [d.
at 733-34. This exemption is limited to salaried employees. It is not clear whether the
plaintiff was a salaried employee, because he was often paid at an hourly rate for addi
tional hours when he worked more than eighty hours bi-weekly. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d
at 303-04 n.5. This Note will not address the issue whether Plaintiff falls under 29
C.F.R. §§ 541.1-541.3 (2003).
101. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 311. A three judge panel for the Fourth Circuit
heard this case and reached a 2-1 decision. Judge Luttig, the dissenting judge, recom
mended that the plaintiff petition the entire Fourth Circuit to hear the case. Moreover,
Judge Luttig noted that even if a ministerial exemption existed, it would not be as far
reaching as the majority held. [d.
102. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 797, 797-98
(4th Cir. 2004).
103. [d. However, there was a significant split between the judges. Though nine
judges voted against rehearing the case, four judges joined Judge Luttig in his dissenting
opinion, which was significantly longer than his prior dissenting opinion. [d.
104. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 728,
730 (D. Md. 2003), affd, 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004). Note that the issue identified by
the District Court is not whether there is a recognized exemption to the FLSA. The
court seems to assume that one exists. The second issue before the court is whether, if
the exemption is inapplicable, Plaintiff was an exempt managerial, professional, or ad
ministrative employee. [d. As previously mentioned, this Note will not address the
second issue.
105. [d. at 733; Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 310-11.
106. Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990). For fur
ther discussion of Dole, see infra Part II.B.2. For a discussion of the Shaliehsabou
court's reliance on Dole, see infra Part III.H.
99.
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Basing its decision on congressional debate and Labor Department
guidelines, the Fourth Circuit in Dole recognized an exemption
from the FLSA similar in scope to the ministerial exemption from
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.107
In his brief, yet striking, dissent, Judge Luttig wholly rejected
the majority opinion, arguing that no such exemption from the
FLSA existed. lOB Judge Luttig, dissenting in two sentences, stated,
I do not believe that there is a 'ministerial exemption' to the Fair
Labor Standards Act, ... and if there were, I do not believe that
it would be as far-reaching as the court holds today. Because of
the obvious importance of the issue decided, and the evident in
correctness of the court's holding, I urge the appellant to seek
rehearing en bane from this court, and failing rehearing en bane
by this court, to seek review in the Supreme Court of the United
States. 109

As previously noted, upon Shaliehsabou's petition, a majority
of the Fourth Circuit declined to hear the case.11° This prompted
an in-depth dissenting opinion from Judge Luttig.111 Pointing to the
majority's reliance on congressional debate,112 Judge Luttig noted
that no other court had ever excluded an employee from FLSA
coverage based on a ministerial exemption. 113
2.

Additional FLSA Cases

In carving out its ministerial exemption to the FLSA, the
Shaliehsabou majority relied on the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church. 114 The Dole decision high
107. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 305; Dole, 899 F.2d at 1397.
108. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 311 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
109. Id. Perhaps Judge Luttig chose to write such a brief dissenting opinion be
cause he felt confident in his conclusion and believed that upon revisiting this case other
judges would draw the same conclusion.
110. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 797, 797 (4th
Cir. 2004). Within the Fourth Circuit, four judges voted to rehear the case, and nine
voted against revisiting it. Id.
111. Id. at 798-806 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
112. Id. Judge Luttig referred to the lack of a textual basis for a ministerial ex
emption, the majority's unfounded reliance on congressional debate, and its improper
reliance on DOL guidelines. For a more detailed discussion of Judge Luttig's analysis,
see infra Part III.
113. Id. at 798. Though in Dole the Fourth Circuit did acknowledge such an ex
emption in dicta, it did not apply the exemption because the plaintiff did not meet the
"primary duties" test. See infra Part III.B; Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899
F.2d 1389, 1396 (4th Cir. 1990).
114. See Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 305 (citing Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist
Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1391-92 (4th Cir. 1990».
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lights the judicial confusion surrounding the existence of a ministe
rial exemption to the FLSA. Dole involved a salary dispute
between the Shenandoah Baptist Church and the teachers and staff
who worked at the church's Christian school, Roanoke Valley.115
The government brought suit alleging that Shenandoah violated
two elements of the FLSA by paying support staff less than mini
mum wage and by paying female teachers less than male teach
ers.1 16 Shenandoah argued that Congress did not intend schools
such as Roanoke Valley to be covered as "enterprises" under the
FLSA, and that Congress did not intend the Act to cover teachers
and staff at church-run schools as "employees."117
To determine whether Congress intended to include schools
such as Roanoke Valley within the term "enterprise,"118 the court
looked to congressional debate surrounding the aforementioned
1966 amendment to the FLSA.n 9 Though Shenandoah argued that
the amendment was ambiguous, the court concluded that Congress
clearly intended to include a school such as Roanoke Valley within
the ACt. 120
After deciding the "enterprise" question, the court turned to
whether Congress intended those employed as teachers and staff to
be covered as "employees" under the FLSA.l2l Based on the pri
mary duties test applied in Rayburn, the court held that the plain
tiffs did not fall within a ministerial exemption from the FLSA.122
Significantly, the Fourth Circuit relied on Rayburn, a Title VII case,
in determining whether Dole was a protected employee under the
115. Dole, 899 F.2d at 1391-92.
116. [d. at 1392.
117. [d. at 1393-94.
118. As previously noted, the question whether Roanake Valley fell within the
term "enterprise" is beyond the scope of this Note. However, congressional debate on
this issue, addressed elsewhere in this Note, does shed some light on whether ministe
rial workers are "employees" under the FLSA. See Parts I.B and IILB for further
discussion of this congressional debate.
119. Id. at 1394; see supra Part LB.
120. Id. at 1395. The court notes that plain language indicates Congress's inten
tion to include public and private schools, regardless of whether the particular school is
operated for profit. Id. at 1394 (citing 29 U.S.c. § 203(r) (2000».
121. Id. at 1396.
122. Id. at 1396-97. The Rayburn court held that a ministerial exemption from
Title VII depended on the "spiritual and pastoral" function of the position and not the
characterization of the position as clergy. Note that this case was talking about an ex
emption from Title VII and not an exemption from the FLSA. Rayburn v. General
Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (4th Cir. 1985). The
Dole court does not clearly justify its decision to extend the Title VII "employee" crite
ria to the proposed FLSA "employee" exemption.
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FLSA.123 The Dole court did not justify this extension of the "pri
mary duties" test, nor did it consider the contrast between a Title
VII claim for discrimination in hiring decisions and a FLSA claim
involving wage and hour concerns.
In addition to congressional debate, the Dole court looked to
guidelines issued by the Labor Department's Wage and Hour Ad
ministrator to carve out this ministerial exemption to the FLSA.124
DOL guidelines state, in pertinent part, that "[p]ersons such as
nuns, monks, priests, lay brothers, ministers, deacons and other
members of religious orders who serve pursuant to their religious
obligations in the schools ... operated by their church or religious
order shall not be considered to be 'employees.' "125 The United
States Supreme Court, however, has announced that the weight
given to an administrator's decision depends on the thoroughness
of consideration, validity of reasoning, and consistency with earlier
pronouncements. 126 The Dole decision does not indicate that the
court considered these factors before relying on the DOL
guidelines.
In Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor
("Alamo")127 the Supreme Court sets forth principles that are ap
plicable to the FLSA question Shaliehsabou presents. In Alamo,
the primary issue was whether the FLSA's minimum wage, over
time, and record-keeping requirements applied to workers engaged
in the commercial activities of a religious organization, and whether
such an application would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. 128 The employees in Alamo provided services at
a number of the Foundation's commercial businesses, which raised
money for a variety of Christian programs. 129 The Foundation ar
gued that the FLSA was inapplicable because its workers did not
receive monetary wages and, therefore, were not "employees. "130
123. Dole, 899 F.2d at 1396-97.
124. Id. at 1396.
125. Id. at 1396 (quoting Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Field
Operations Handbook § 10b03(b) (1967».
126. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). See infra Part III.B for a
further explanation of this concept.
127. Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
128. Id. at 291-92.
129. Id. at 292. The Foundation's Articles of Incorporation provided that its pri
mary purposes were to "establish, conduct and maintain an Evangelistic Church; to
conduct religious services, to minister to the sick and needy, to care for the fatherless
and to rescue the fallen, and generally to do those things needful for the promotion of
Christian faith, virtue, and charity." Id.
130. Id. at 292, 300. Though the workers did not receive cash salaries, they were
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Moreover, the workers themselves protested the Act's coverage.1 31
The Court held, however, that the "purposes of the Act require that
it be applied even to those who would decline its protections. "132
The Court went on to explain that if it recognized an exception for
employees who claimed that they performed services "voluntarily,"
employers could potentially assert superior bargaining power to co
erce workers to waive FLSA protection by claiming that they
worked voluntarily.133 Further, the Court classified the workers'
duties as more than" 'a religious liturgy engaged in bringing good
news to a pagan world'" because the Foundation had entered the
"economic arena."134 Therefore, the Court held that the Founda
tion's commercial activities fell within the reach of the FLSA.135
Thus, after Alamo, the FLSA's provisions could be applied to relig
ious organizations that engaged in commercial activities undertaken
with a business purpose, even though workers were actively in
volved in spreading the Christian faith.13 6 In light of the shortcom
ings of the Shaliehsabou majority's decision, it is appropriate to
question the Shaliehsabou court's failure to consider the Supreme
Court's extension of FLSA protection to a religious organization in
Alamo.
III.

ANALYSIS

This Note argues that the Fourth Circuit's decisions in Dole
and Shaliehsabou, which carved out a ministerial exception to the
FLSA, were in error. Moreover, the exemption that the Shalieh
sabou court ultimately recognized went far beyond any scope that a
ministerial exemption to the FLSA could reasonably encompass.
Drawing from the dissenting opinion in the principal case, the main
points of this argument are discussed below.
dependent on the Foundation for food, clothing, shelter and other benefits. The Court
found this compensation adequate to classify the workers as employees. Id. at 292, 301.
131. [d. at 302.
132.
133.
134.

[d.
[d.
[d. at 294-295 (quoting Donovan v. Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation, 722

F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1983». The Court applied the "economic reality" test to deter
mine whether the Foundation is an enterprise under the Act. [d. at 294.
135. [d. at 306.
136. The Court held that application of the Act would not impact the Founda
tion's evangelical activities because the Act's provisions impose very minimal govern
ment entanglement with religion. The Court noted that the "Establishment Clause
does not exempt religious organizations from ... secular governmental activity," and
that the record-keeping provisions of the FLSA are not significantly intrusive into relig
ious affairs. [d. at 305-06.
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A.

Ministerial Exemption is Without a Textual or Precedential
Basis

Neither Supreme Court precedent interpreting the FLSA nor
the text of the Act itself supports a ministerial exemption from the
FLSA. The ministerial exemption proposed in Shaliehsabou is un
detectable in the text of the FLSA, though the Act enumerates doz
ens of exemptions.137 If Congress intended to include a ministerial
exemption, it was capable of doing so explicitly.138 With respect to
statutory interpretation, Justice Scalia has suggested that judges
should avoid efforts to glean legislative intent.139 He asserts that
when courts attempt to determine what legislators mean, judges
often end up pursuing their own objectives and desires. 14o Rather
than looking to legislative intent, courts should focus on the plain
text of a statute, and the plain text of the FLSA clearly lacks a min
isterial exemption. 141
The text of the FLSA sets forth a detailed explanation of the
intended broad meaning of the term "employee."142 The FLSA
purposely defines "employee" in very general terms as "any indi
vidual employed by an employer."143 Also, the Supreme Court has
clearly stated that the test for employment under the FLSA is "one
of economic reality," turning on whether the person undertook the
job "in expectation of compensation."144 Clearly, Shaliehsabou ex
pected compensation for his duties, evidenced by the fact that he
137. See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, supra note 5, at 295-303.
138. When Congress creates exceptions within a statute, it is presumed that Con
gress considered the issue of exceptions and included the ones that it intended to in
clude and left out the ones that it intended to leave out. See, e.g., TRW, Inc. v.
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19,28 (2001); United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000); An
drus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608,616-17 (1980).
139. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3,16-18 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
140. Id. at 17-18.
141. Id. at 17.
142. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 797, 799
(2004) (Luttig, J., dissenting).
143. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.c. § 203(e) (2000)); see also Tony and Susan Alamo
Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 295 (1985) (explaining that the FLSA defines
"employee" in "exceedingly broad terms").
144. Alamo,471 U.S. at 301-02 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has fur
ther expanded the "economic reality" test in at least one instance. In Mitchell v. Pil
grim Holiness Church Corp., the court held that employees of a religious corporation
were entitled to FLSA protection, even after several employees filed affidavits indicat
ing that they did not consider themselves "'mere wage earners,' but rather that they
had accepted work with the defendant in belief that they were doing religious work."
Mitchell, 210 F.2d 879, 881 (1954) (citation omitted).
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filed suit to recover wages. 145 Consequently, it seems logical that he
would be entitled to the protections of the Act. Further, the Su
preme Court has instructed that the FLSA be applied "liberally...
to the furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction."146
The Court has repeatedly cautioned lower courts not to overstep
their bounds in applying FLSA exceptions. 147 Based on the preced
ing findings, the majority's decision was in direct conflict with Su
preme Court precedent.
To be sure, it is arguable that a lengthy list of exemptions from
the FLSA implies that Congress did not intend the FLSA's reach to
be expansive.1 48 Yet this contention is weak because the FLSA's
legislative history indicates that Congress intended very broad cov
erage. 149 Based on the Act's unambiguous text and its legislative
history, the Supreme Court has announced that Congress intended
the Act's coverage to be expansive, indicating that the list of ex
emptions was intended to be exhaustive, rather than illustrative. 150
This line of reasoning bolsters the dissenting argument in Shalieh
sabou that the majority erred in reading into the FLSA a ministe
rial exemption that lacks support in the Act's text.
B.

The Fourth Circuit's Reliance on Dole in Deciding
Shaliehsabou

The Fourth Circuit based its conclusion in Shaliehsabou on its
earlier decision in Dole. 151 Yet a consideration of the basis and the
shortcomings of Dole indicates that this reliance was in error. 152
145. See Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d
728 (D. Md. 2003), affd, 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004).
146. Alamo, 471 U.S. at 296 (quoting Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assoc.,
353 U.S. 207, 211 (1959)).
147. [d.; see also A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (declaring
that exemption from FLSA coverage should extend only to those "plainly and unmis
takably within its terms and spirit").
148. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 649 (1990)
(holding list of exemptions to be illustrative where neither the text nor the legislative
history indicates that the list was intended to be exhaustive). But see City of Chicago v.
Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 337-38 (1994); Keene Corp. v. United
States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (holding that listed exemptions demonstrate that Con
gress knew how to draft exemptions, and would have done so if a particular exemption
were intended). The fact that Congress has created and revoked exemptions over time
also indicates that Congress is prepared and willing to change the Act's provisions when
necessary. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 160-61.
149. Alamo, 471 U.S. at 296.
150. [d.
151. Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990).
152. This Note is not intended to imply that Dole was decided incorrectly, be
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First, it seems inappropriate that in recognizing a ministerial ex
emption from the FLSA, the Dole court turned to congressional
debate surrounding the "enterprise" amendment of 1966. 153 The
original version of the amendment would have included schools of
higher learning, but not elementary or secondary schools. 154 Con
gressman Collier proposed that the amendment also include public
and private elementary and secondary schools.1 55 Although Con
gressman Collier expressed that he "did not intend to cover [nuns
as employees]," an amendment to the term "employee" was never
drafted.1 56 The amendment's final version did not address a minis
terial exception to the term "employee" under the FLSA.157 The
final amendment stated solely that elementary and secondary
schools, whether operated for profit or not for profit, should be
considered "enterprises" for FLSA purposes.158
The Dole majority's reliance on the 1966 congressional ex
change between Congressmen Collier and Burton was misplaced.1 59
The majority in Shaliehsabou and the Dole court assert that this
debate provides a basis and a justification for a ministerial exemp
tion from the FLSA.l60 However, "the debate in which the relevant
exchange occurred did not concern the term it is offered to modify[,
employee,] and Congress modified the definition of the term at is
sue[, enterprise,] immediately following the debate ... but not in
the way suggested by the exchange."161 Had Congress enacted an
amendment to the term "employee" after the debate, its intent to
cause the court in Shaliehsabou is relying strictly on dicta in Dole. In dicta, the Dole
court announced that there was a ministerial exemption from the FLSA. Id. at 1396.
However, such an exemption would not affect the outcome of Dole because the em
ployees at the church-operated schools did not meet the primary duties test, which the
court applied. Id. at 1397.
153. Id. at 1394. For further explanation of the 1966 amendment and its accom
panying congressional debate, see supra Parts I.B and II.B.2.
154. Dole, 899 F.2d at 1394.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See 29 U.S.c. § 203(r)-(s) (2000).
158. Dole, 899 F.2d at 1394; see also 29 U.S.c. § 203(r). The final version of the
amendment changed the criteria for the "enterprise" aspect of the FLSA, but not for
the "employee" aspect.
159. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 797, 800-01
(4th Cir. 2004) (Luttig, J., dissenting) (citing 112 CONGo REC. 11360, 11371 (1966)).
160. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 306 (4th
Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane denied, 369 F.3d 797 (4th Cir. 2004); Dole, 899 F.2d at 1396.
161. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 801 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (citing to the final ver
sion of the amendment, which appears in 29 U.S.c. § 203(e)(3), and Fair Labor Stan
dards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830). Because Congress did not
amend the term "employee" there is no way to discern whether other members of Con
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preclude ministerial employers from enjoying protection under the
FLSA would be clear, but it did not.1 62 Therefore, and in accor
dance with Judge Luttig's argument, the 1966 congressional ex
change is not a meaningful foundation for the exemption. 163
Although the congressional exchange demonstrates that one or
two members of the House believed that "members of a religious
order" were not "employees" within the FLSA,it fails as a demon
stration of congressional intent. 164 The Fourth Circuit and the Su
preme Court have recognized that "[t]he remarks of individual
legislators, even sponsors of legislation, ... are not regarded as a
reliable measure of congressional intent."165 This maxim is particu
larly relevant when the meaning of the statutory text is clear. 166 In
certain situations, congressional exchanges can aid in attributing
meaning to ambiguous pieces of legislation. However, as noted
previously, the plain language of the FLSA is devoid of an intention
to provide an exemption for ministerial employees, and therefore
the remarks relied on by the Dole court are not a reliable measure
of congressional intent. Despite the contrary context and lack of
authority of the 1966 congressional exchange, both the Fourth Cir
cuit and the DOL relied on it to carve out a ministerial exception to
the FLSA.
The Dole court concluded that a ministerial exemption from
the FLSA was appropriate, relying on the congressional exchange,
but held that the plaintiffs did not fall within this narrow exception,
based on the "primary duties" test announced in Rayburn. 167 The
"primary duties" test established for Title VII claims, however, is
gress supported Congressman Collier's interpretation of the term "employee." Id. at
801 n.2.
162. Note that congressional intent is arguably very clear because Congress dis
cussed the term employee and had the opportunity to amend and clarify the statute.
However, it chose not to.
163. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 800-02.
164. Id. at 800.
165. Id. at 801 (citing w. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991);
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982); Roy v. County of Lexington, 141 F.3d 533,
539 (4th Cir. 1998)) (alteration in original).
166. Id. at 801 (citing Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, 506 U.S. 153, 166
(1993); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 237 (1984); Pa. RR Co. v. Int'! Coal Mining Co.,
230 U.S. 184, 199 (1913)).
167. Dole, 899 F.2d at 1396-97. The Rayburn court held that a ministerial exemp
tion from Title VII depended on the "spiritual and pastoral" function of the position
and not the characterization of the position as clergy. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of
Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (4th Cir. 1985). Note that this case was
discussing an exemption from Title VII and not an exemption from the FLSA.
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not pertinent to claims of employees under the FLSA.168 Moreo
ver, the Dole court did not clearly justify its decision to extend the
Title VII "employee" criteria to the proposed FLSA "employee"
exemption. 169 Judge Luttig points out in his dissenting opinion,
"The fact that an individual is a 'ministerial' employee or that his
primary duties are religious in nature has no bearing on [the] deter
mination [of whether that person is to be considered an employee
under the FLSA]."170
The 1966 congressional dialogue misled not only the Dole
court, but also the DOL.I71 In fact, in recognizing a ministerial ex
emption from the FLSA, the Dole court relied considerably on
DOL guidelines, which sought to decipher the 1966 legislative dis
cussion. l72 In spite of the inherent flaws in the aforementioned
congressional exchange, the Wage and Hour Division of the DOL
relied on this dialogue to add a provision to its Field Operations
Handbook ("FOH")P3 The provision states that "[p]ersons such
as nuns, monks, priests, lay brothers, ministers, deacons, and other
members of religious orders who serve pursuant to their religious
obligations in the schools, hospitals, and other institutions operated
by their church or religious order shall not be considered to be 'em
ployees."'174 Though the DOL decided to list this provision in its
handbook, the FOH by no means compels a court to apply its con
tentsp5 Generally, when an administrative agency is empowered
168. See Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 800 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
169. Further, when the Shaliehsabou court extended the Title VII employee crite
ria to its proposed FLSA ministerial exemption, its sole justification was that this partic
ular court had drawn the same analogy in past cases. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of
Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 306-07 (4th Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane denied, 369 F.3d
797 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Dole and EEOC). The Shaliehsabou majority did say that
courts are familiar and comfortable with this test. Id. at 307. But is that really a valid
reason for choosing to apply a particular test?
170. Id. at 799. Here Judge Luttig is referring to the primary duties test utilized
in Rayburn, a Title VII case. See supra Part II.A.
171. Congress gave the U.S. DOL the power to enforce and interpret the FLSA.
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr supra note 5, at 40.
172. Dole, 899 F.2d at 1396.
173. The Field Operations Handbook is a guide for Wage and Hour investigators,
and is also available to the public. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at
40-41.
174. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 797, 801 (4th
Cir. 2004) (citing WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, infra note 178, at
§ lOb03).
175. See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 164-66; see, e.g.,
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that administrative rulings,
interpretations, and opinions may provide guidance but are not controlling); Overnight
Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 580 n.17 (1942) (interpretive bulletins from
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to craft legislation, resulting regulations are given the force of
lawP6 However, where the agency is only given the power to inter
pret regulations, the findings are not binding.1 77 In its foreword,
the FOH states that it is "not used as a device for establishing inter
pretive policy."178 Indeed, in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. ,179 the Su
preme Court listed factors to consider when assessing the degree of
deference to be afforded to an interpretive regulation issued by an
administrative body assigned the task of interpreting a law. 180 The
Court offered the following:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under the Act, while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of expe
rience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control. 181

In adopting a religious exception to the FLSA based solely on
a congressional exchange between a few members of Congress, the
DOL failed to thoroughly consider the issue before it. Conse
quently, the DOL guideline should be afforded limited defer
ence.1 82 The DOL provides no reasoning or rationale in the FOH
for the exclusion of ministerial employees, and therefore, this regu
lation has "no persuasive power beyond the exchange on the House
administrative agencies do carry persuasiveness but are not binding authority); Sher
wood v. Washington Post, 871 F.Supp. 1471, 1481 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that interpre
tations of administrative agencies are not legislative regulations and do not have force
of law); Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 1220, 1228 (5th Cir. 1990) (administrative
interpretations are not binding as law and are merely "a body of experience and in
formed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance" (quot
ing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140)).
176. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 164-66.
177. Id.
178. WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, FIELD OPERATIONS
HANDBOOK 1 (1993). The guidelines in the FOH are not intended to be official rules
and regulations, but are merely intended to provide guidance for employees. The
DOL's official regulations, which it is empowered to enact into law, provide no similar
exemption for "ministerial employees." Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 802 n.5.
179. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
180. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 165-66 (citing Skid
more, 323 U.S. at 140).
18l. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
182. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 800-02 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
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floor on which it was based."183 The Fourth Circuit erred in defer
ring to the DOL guidelines without considering either the reason
ing behind such guidelines or the appropriate weight to be afforded
to them. In turn, both the Dole and Shaliehsabou opinions relied
on refutable DOL guidelines to carve out a ministerial exception to
the FLSA.
To further complicate the court's already problematic reliance
on DOL guidelines, the Shaliehsabou court applied the FLSA min
isterial exception based on its decision in Dole, and held that
Shaliehsabou was not entitled to overtime pay in light of his pri
mary duties as a Mashgiach.184 The Shaliehsabou decision is a
product of the majority's reliance on Dole, which improperly relied
on DOL guidelines. As demonstrated previously, the DOL guide
lines were a product of improper reliance on congressional debate.
The Shaliehsabou decision is the most recent link in a chain of
faulty reasoning.

C.

Scope of the Ministerial Exemption

The Dole and Shaliehsabou majorities not only accepted a
ministerial exemption from the FLSA but also expanded it far be
yond any reasonably intended reach.1 85 As Judge Luttig concedes,
even though the exemption adopted by the DOL lacks credibility, it
is at least a narrow exception, as required by the Supreme Court. 186
Though in 1966 Congressman Collier broadly stated "that 'mem
bers of a religious order' were not 'employees' within the meaning
of the [FLSA]," the FOR adopted a more narrow construction of
the rule. 187 The FOR "provided that, '[1] members of religious or
ders who [2] serve pursuant to their religious obligations [3] in the
schools, hospitals, and other institutions operated by their church or
religious order shall not be considered to be 'employees.' "188 De
183. Id. at 802; see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that legislative history must reach a high level of
certainty to support an agency interpretation that departs from a facially clear statute).
184. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 311 (4th
Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane denied, 369 F.3d 797 (4th Cir. 2004).
185. Id. at 798, 802 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 802. Exemptions from the FLSA are to be narrowly construed be
cause Congress put considerable time and effort into carefully considering and enumer
ating exemptions. See generally THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Aer, supra note 5, at
163-64. See also A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945); Addison v.
Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944).
187. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 800, 802 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 802-03 (citing WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, supra note 178, at
§ 10b03).

2006]

SHALIEHSABOU V. HEBREW HOME

395

spite the Supreme Court's mandate necessitating narrow exemp
tions to the FLSA,189 the majority in Shaliehsabou went beyond the
standards set forth by both Congressman Collier and the DOL
guidelines and "adopt[ ed] wholesale the contours of the constitu
tionally-required exception of 'ministerial' employees from the cov
erage of Title VII and other civil rights laws."190
The excessively broad test that Shaliehsabou adopted for de
termining whether a person is exempt under the proposed ministe
rial exemption to the FLSA is as follows: An employee is exempt
from the FLSA's coverage "so long as (1) [the] employee's 'primary
duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance,
supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in
religious ritual and worship,' and (2) that employee is employed by
a 'religiously-affiliated' institution 'marked by clear or obvious re
ligious characteristics.' "191 Applying this standard in Title VII
cases, courts have excluded secular workers in religious institutions
from Title VII protection. 192 However, none of these employees
would have been excluded had the applicable test been similar to
that described in the FOH, which focuses on an employee's "relig
ious obligations," and not his or her "primary duties."193 More im
portantly, Shaliehsabou, an employee responsible for supervising
food preparation in compliance with Jewish dietary laws in a nurs
ing home, may not have met the DOL's more rigid standard for an
exemption. 194 Had the court applied the DOL standard set forth in
the FOH, rather than the Title VII standard, Shaliehsabou may
have been afforded FLSA coverage. Thus, the broad scope of the
constitutionally-compelled Title VII exemption "cannot be recon
ciled with" the narrow exemption alluded to in the 1966 congres
189. See generally THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 5, at 163-64.
See also A.H. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 493; Addison, 322 U.S. at 618.
190. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 802 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
191. [d. at 803 (citations omitted).
192. See, e.g., Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698, 704
(7th Cir. 2003) (applying exemption to church press secretaries); EEOC v. Southwest
ern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying exemp
tion to faculty at seminaries). However, Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary
of Labor makes clear that the government is free to involve itself in secular activities of
religious organizations for FLSA purposes. 471 U.S. 290, 305-06 (1985).
193. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 803 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
194. [d. Judge Luttig explained that Shaliehsabou would not meet the DOL stan
dard of (1) "'a member of a religious order'" who was (2) '''serv[ing] pursuant to [a]
religious obligation.'" [d. (citing WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, supra note 178, at
§ lOb03).
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sional hearing and described in the FOH.1 95
The Shaliehsabou majority failed to justify its extension of the
Title VII standard to FLSA disputes. Judge Luttig points out,
[T]he majority not only accepts [an exemption for ministers]
from the FLSA without so much as questioning the soundness of
its foundation, but expands the contours of the exemption far be
yond that which even the exemption's shaky foundation can sup
port. In so doing, the majority rejects the only conceivable basis
for a ministerial exemption in sources related to the Act itself,
and, instead, adopts [the requirements] of the constitutionally-re
quired [Title VII exemption].196
The majority adopted the Title VII standard for exceptions to
the FLSA as a "'common sense approach'" because the two are
"'coterminous in scope. "'197 However, there exists a discrepancy
between the origin of a Title VII exemption, which is rooted in con
stitutional principles, and the proposed FLSA exemption, which is
based on congressional debate and the DOL guidelines. 198 An ex
emption from Title VII for a religious organization's decisions in
hiring ministerial employees is necessitated by the First Amend
ment's Religion Clauses. If Congress interfered with hiring deci
sions with respect to employees who perform religious functions, it
would be interfering with the free exercise of religion. 199 However,
constitutional problems do not arise when the FLSA is applied to
religious organizations. Compelling religious organizations to com
ply with fair labor standards by paying a minimum wage and over
time pay affects the organization's economic position, not its
religious goals. In fact, imposing fair labor standards in no way in
terferes with hiring decisions.
Another flawed reason that the majority offered in favor of the
195. Id. at 804; see EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795,
801 (4th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he ministerial exception to Title VII is robust where it
applies.").
196. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 802 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Judge Luttig seems to be saying that the majority has no justification for carving out an
exemption to the FLSA, especially because the majority is inventing an exception
nearly identical in scope to the "constitutionally-required" exemption under Title VII.
197. Id. at 803 (referring to majority's statement in Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew
Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 306 (4th Cir. 2004) ("coextensive in scope"
and "common sense approach"».
198. Id. at 803-04. A Title VII exemption is based on the necessity for autonomy
in religious organizations' hiring decisions. However, compelling a religious organiza
tion to pay a minimum wage or overtime pay does not hinder religious autonomy in the
same way that state interference with hiring decisions would.
199. See infra Part III.D for further explanation of these constitutional principles.
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Title VII "primary duties" test was that the court had already im
plied the applicability of the primary duties test in Dole .200 The
previous section demonstrates, however, that the reasoning applied
by the Dole court in announcing a ministerial exemption to the
FLSA was faulty. Moreover, in Dole, the Title VII cases referred
to by the employer were merely distinguished and found irrelevant
by the court.201
As support for its holding, the majority also relied upon the
listing of Dole in a string citation in the EEOC202 case as support
for the proposition that '''[t]he ministerial exception operates to ex
empt from the coverage of various employment laws the employ
ment relationships between religious institutions and their
'ministers."'203 It is, however, irrelevant that Dole was listed in a
string citation in EEOC to support this proposition. 204 EEOC was
a Title VII case in which FLSA issues were not before the court. 205
The court cannot reasonably lend meaning to the Dole case based
on dicta from a Title VII case, without stretching the meaning of
the Title VII case beyond recognition. 206
D.

No Collision between the FLSA and the First Amendment
1.

Establishment Clause

An additional blemish on the Shaliehsabou majority's ruling is
that it found the FLSA exemption to be commensurate with the
Title VII exemption "in order to 'avoid answering a difficult consti
tutional question [such as] whether the First Amendment would
otherwise compel an exception to the FLSA coextensive with that
recognized as constitutionally mandated in the Title VII con
text."207 As a general matter, it seems unreasonable for judges to
issue particular rulings merely to avoid answering difficult ques
tions. Furthermore, Judge Luttig posited that in Shaliehsabou con
200. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 306 (4th
Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane denied, 369 F.3d 797 (4th Cir. 2004).
201. [d. See generally Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir.
1990).
202. EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir.
2000).
203. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 306 (quoting EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 2000».
204. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 804 (Luttig, I., dissenting)
205. [d.
206. [d.
207. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 306. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of policy
reasons behind Title VII ministerial exemptions.

398

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:369

stitutional concerns were not at issue. 208 Requiring Hebrew Home
to pay Shaliehsabou for overtime hours "does not require the gov
ernment-or the court-to question the Hebrew Home's religious
beliefs, inquire into the religious nature of the activities that
Shaliehsabou performs, or to become involved in any way in the
governance or functioning of the institution. "209
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Alamo held that the minimum
wage, overtime, and record-keeping provisions of the FLSA could
be applied to religious organizations engaged in "'commercial ac
tivities undertaken with a business purpose.' "210 The Court noted
that
[allowing the Foundation to pay employees] substandard wages
would undoubtedly give petitioners and similar organizations an
advantage over their competitors. It is exactly this kind of "un
fair method of competition" that the [FLSA] was intended to
prevent ... and the admixture of religious motivation does not
alter a business's effect on commerce. 211

Moreover, by providing this economic advantage to religious
organizations, the government arguably would be favoring religion
over secularism, thereby violating the Establishment Clause. 212 The
Court further explained that this level of government intervention
would not pose a risk of improper government interference with
208. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 805 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (noting, as evidence of
this proposition, that Hebrew Home did not even suggest constitutional concerns in its
briefs).
209. Id. (citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 u.s. 378,
395-97 (1990». Jimmy Swaggart Ministries held that the government violates the First
Amendment when it interferes with the church's right to religious autonomy. 493 u.s.
at 395-97.
210. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 805 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (quoting Tony and Su
san Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290,305 (1985». In Alamo, the Act was
held applicable to a non-profit religious organization. The organization's primary pur
poses were to "establish, conduct and maintain an Evangelistic Church; to conduct re
ligious services, to minister to the sick and needy, to care for the fatherless and to
rescue the fallen, and generally to do those things needful for the promotion of Chris
tian faith, virtue and charity." Alamo, 471 U.S. at 292. For a further explanation of
Alamo, see supra Part II.B.2.
211. David L. Gregory, Government Regulation of Religion Through Labor and
Employment Discrimination Laws, 22 STETSON L. REv. 27, 51-52 (1992) (quoting
Alamo, 471 U.S. at 299) (alterations in original). In Alamo, the Supreme Court stated
that "[r]eligious organizations do not have carte blanche to exploit persons employed in
their commercial ventures." David L. Gregory, The First Amendment Religion Clauses
and Labor and Employment Law in the Supreme Court, 1984 Term, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 1, 24 (1986).
212. Alamo, 471 U.S. at 305-06.
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religious autonomy.213 Had the Shaliehsabou court compelled He
brew Home to provide overtime pay to the plaintiff, a worker who
supervised food preparation in accordance with Jewish kosher laws,
the finding would be easily reconcilable with the Supreme Court's
decision in Alamo. 214 Like the Alamo Foundation, Hebrew Home
of Greater Washington is a non-profit religious organization that
has entered the "economic arena. "215 A strong comparison can be
made between Shaliehsabou, a supervisor in a religiously-based
nursing home's kitchen, and the workers who were spreading the
Christian faith for the Alamo Foundation. Thus, relieving Hebrew
Home of its duty to pay Shaliehsabou, an employee who worked in
exchange for compensation, would violate the Establishment
Clause by favoring religious organizations engaged in commerce
over similar secular organizations.
2.

Free Exercise Clause

There exists a major distinction between imposing fair labor
standards upon a religious organization and interfering with that
organization's hiring choices. "Any [effort by the state] to restrict a
church's free choice [in employing] its leaders ... constitutes a bur
den on the church's free exercise rights."216 If such an attempt is
made by the government, the court must resolve the free exercise
question by applying a balancing test. The test involves "a balanc
ing of the burden on free exercise against the 'impediment to ...
[the state's] objectives that would flow from recognizing the
claimed ... exemption.' "217 As previously explained, the Rayburn
court applied the "primary duties" test 218 to assess whether the
functions of the position embody the basic purpose of the religious
institution. If they do, then state scrutiny of the hiring process
would raise constitutional concerns, as the state "must not foster
'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "219
213. Shaliehsabou, 369 F.3d at 805 (citing Alamo, 471 U.S. at 305).
214. It seems highly unlikely that compelling Hebrew Home to provide Shalieh
sabou with overtime pay would affect the religious autonomy of the nursing home.
215. It seems that Hebrew Home meets the "economic reality" test applied in
Alamo, 471 U.S. at 294-95.
216. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168
(4th Cir. 1985).
217. [d. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972» (alterations in
original).
218. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
219. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970». In Lemon, the Supreme Court proposed the following test
for determining the validity of a statute under the Establishment Clause: "First, the
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However, the FLSA is not concerned with hiring, and compel
ling a religious organization to act in accordance with the FLSA
does not implicate the First Amendment. Though it is arguable that
Shaliehsabou's primary duties are ministerial, such a finding is of no
consequence. The primary duties test is to be applied to employees
seeking relief under Title VII and not to employees, like Shalieh
sabou, staking a claim under FLSA. Application of fair labor stan
dards to religious organizations does not compromise religious
freedom in the same manner as would state interference with a re
ligious organization's hiring. If application of fair labor standards
did in fact compromise religious freedom, religious organizations
would be entirely exempt from FLSA scrutiny, perhaps even with
respect to non-ministerial employees. This result would be in direct
conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in Alamo ,220
While applying fair labor standards to religious organizations
does impose minimal interference with an organization's labor
practices, the application does not violate the First Amendment be
cause the First Amendment does not operate without limitation. 221
Although individuals have the right "to believe in any religious doc
trine," the "power to act pursuant to that belief" is limited. 222 The
Supreme Court has explained that the free exercise guarantee is
"not violated by reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulation by" the
government to "preserve[] peace, order and tranquility."223 In
Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., the Seventh Circuit held
"that the [FLSA] is ... a reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulation"
promulgated by Congress that applied to Pilgrim Holiness Church
Corporation ("Pilgrim Church"), an organization that prints and
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Id. at 612-13 (quoting
Walz, 397 U.S. at 674) (citation omitted). The application of Title VII to decisions
regarding employment of ministerial figures violates the third factor of the Lemon test.
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1170.
220. Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
221. Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 1954).
222. Id. at 884. The court cites Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38, 40 (5th Cir.
1949) to explain that "[t]he guaranty of freedom of religion ... is not a guaranty of
immunity for violation of law." Id. In Gara, "[t]he defendant ... was found guilty of
violating the Selective Service Act, although he believed that it was his Christian duty
to" do so. Id.; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (affirming a con
viction for bigamy even though the defendant insisted it was his religious duty to marry
his second wife).
223. Mitchell, 210 F.2d at 885 (citing Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395
(1953».
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disseminates religious materia1. 224 The court noted that the FLSA
was intended to protect "the welfare of all workers, and that [apply
ing] the provisions of the Act to" religious corporations would not
violate the First Amendment.225 Arguably, the fact that Shalieh
sabou filed suit to assert his rights under the FLSA makes his case
more compelling than that of Pilgrim Church's workers. Both
Shaliehsabou and the Pilgrim Church employees were spreading re
ligious faith. Yet, Pilgrim Church "filed affidavits made by several
of its employees indicating that they ... had accepted [their posi
tions] in the belief that they were doing religious work," thereby
accepting the inapplicability of the FLSA.226 In contrast, Shalieh
sabou expected the protection of fair labor standards despite his
ministerial role, and asserted his right by filing suit. Strong factual
comparisons can be drawn between Mitchell and Shaliehsabou, and
it seems that if the Fourth Circuit had considered the persuasive
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, it likely would have held that
Shaliehsabou, a kitchen supervisor in a nursing home with a
predominantly Jewish population, was a protected employee under
the FLSA.
CONCLUSION

The Fourth Circuit's decision to recognize a ministerial excep
tion to the FLSA permits religious organizations to exploit workers
who were intended to be protected against unfair labor practices.
Under this decision, religious organizations have been vested with
an unfair economic advantage, in that they will be able to hire
cheap labor. This is precisely the problem that the FLSA was de
signed to prevent.
Although the government walks a fine line when it interferes
with religion, fair labor standards impose a minimal burden, if any,
on free exercise of religion. Fair labor standards merely impose ec
onomic rules; they do not affect a religious organization's inher
ently private hiring criteria. Although the First Amendment's
Religion Clauses embody constitutional rights, fair labor standards
serve equally compelling interests. The critical role of fair labor
standards is especially evident when considered in light of our com
mercial, economically-driven society and the value placed upon
224.
225.
226.
applicable

[d.
[d.

[d. Despite the employees' affidavits, the court still held the FLSA to be
to the Pilgrim Church. [d. at 885.
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these concerns. Religious organizations that have entered the eco
nomic arena should not be shielded so that they may take advan
tage of workers and receive unfair advantages in a competitive
market. Imposing fair labor standards hardly jeopardizes the con
stitutionally protected autonomy of a religious organization. As
Congress has instructed, the judiciary must protect workers who are
at risk of exploitation by applying the FLSA broadly to protect
those who are clearly within its scope.
Sarah L. Santos*

* Thank you to Tracy MagdaJenski for her support and encouragement during
the writing process.

